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I. Introduction 
Not since the 1930s have I been as ooncerned for the short te~ future of 
American agriculture as I an l'X)W. Last year's net f~ incane is estimated at 
only about $15.5 billion. In the aggregate, and in real te~, that is the 
lowest it has been in decades. Fortunately, on a per capita or per fann basis 
the m:mbers are less depressing and, fortunately, they will begin to trerrl 
upward again in 1984. But it looks as if export tonnages will decline for the 
fourth year in a row, and fa~ land values may also decline for the fourth year 
in a row, not a happy trerrl for any of us. 
It is ironic that at the very time our economy as a whole is enjoying a 
dramatic and healthy reco'Iery, its largest iooustry - agriculture - must 
struggle mightily to survive. It is especially ironic when one considers that 
agriculture may be this nation's most efficient iooustry. A further irony is 
that agriculture's fortunes could change so quickly - fran JOOre than $30 billion 
in net incane a decade ago to half that in 1983. 
What haR?ened? Am, more importantly, what can we do through the policy 
making process to reverse these disturbing treoos and ~e agriculture's 
financial outlook? 
II • What Happened 
First, to put all this in perspective, let's deal with \I!ohat happened. '!be 
answer is, a lot, and JOOst of it was our own doing. But we did not worry about 
it much until recently because inflation subsumed our underlying problems. 
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Putting it another way, we shot ourselves in the foot a ntmlber of times in 
recent years but to avoid embarrassment we bandaged the foot very quickly. Now 
the bandages have becane unraveled, and agriculture's financial wounds are fully 
exposed. In addition, the corrective surgery that may now be required is likely 
to be much rore painful, and conceivably rore expensive, than pranpt and 
Unmediate treatment would have been. 
Let • s spend a m::xnent in soul searching, not for the purpose of assessing 
blame for our mistakes - for that is a fruitless endeavor - but as a reminder, 
and as a learning experience. 
First, we embargoed our agricultural products. We deliberately constrained 
their exportation, perhaps for legitimate political reasons though even that is 
a dubious proposition, and forced importers to turn elsewhere for major portions 
of their food needs. We not only became an undependable supplier, we 
essentially forced our customers to make us a residual supplier! After fighting 
for years to extricate ourselves fram the residual supplier category, we 
purposefully put our foot back into that grave. Not only did we do it once, we 
did it several times - under both Democratic and Republican administrations. 
Quick learners we are not! 
second, for many years we have been remarkably tolerant of the unfair trcrle 
practices of other nations. We have pennitted the European Carmunity in 
particular, but other export canpetitors as well, to use export subsidies -
alJOC>st at will - to undercut us in third country markets. Not surprisingly, our 
market share in the affected products has declined; that of other countries, far 
less efficient producers than we, has increased. 
We have also been remarkably tolerant of the import restrictions of other 
nations, i.e., their efforts to keep our agricultural products out. We have not 
leaned on the Japanese very hard even though their efforts to be rore self 
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sufficient in food production are looicrously expensive. Were they to grow less 
rice, we could sell them considerably IOOre wheat, and their food bill would be a 
whole lot lower. 
with the exception of beef and citrus, we have not leaned on them much for 
their import quotas on food products either, even though each of those quotas is 
illegal urxler the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (the GATT). Nor have we 
leaned on the lesser developed countries very much when they follow trade 
practices that are danaging to us, and often not even in their own best 
interests. 
we have also priced ourselves out of the world market much ,too frequently. 
This occurs when our support levels are above global prices, making us the 
supplier of last resort. OUr cx:mpetitors love this situation, and they are the 
first to advocate that we boost our support levels still higher. As intelligent 
marketers, we should urxlerstarxl that what is in the best interest of our 
cx:mpetitors is not necessarily in our best interest. 
we have also taken unilateral actions fran time to time that may have been 
helpful to u.s. farmers in the short run, but damaging in the long rlD'l. unilat-
eral establishment of the grain reserve progran is one exanple. There is sane 
value to a grain reserve, of course, in that it provides a stabilizing force in 
the marketplace. But all exporters arxl imIx>rters benefit fran that increased 
stability, not just the U.S. Yet with a unilaterally established reserve 
progran, we Americans pick up the tab, and everyone else gets off scot freel 
We have also unilaterally cut back on production, the classic case being 
the PIK progran of a year ago though we have taken similar act ions on nunerous 
occasions in the past. That simply hands market share to our canpetitors on a 
silver platter, arxl the American taxpayer absorbs the cost. The best of all 
worlds for our competitors; the worst of all worlds for us! 
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Finally, American agriculture has been buffeted by an array of econanic 
phenanena essentially, if not entirely, outside its control. With fanners beiBJ 
heavy borrowers in what has becane a capital intensive iooustry, high real 
interest rates have been devastatiBJ recently. The leveliBJ off of inflation, 
due primarily to chaBJes in m:>netary policy, has been heal thy for the econany as 
a whole, but tralll\atic for fanners who are highly leveraged. These inclooe sane 
of our very best young producers who exparrled in the '70s, expecting to payoff 
their loans with inflated dollars. Those business decisions were wrong, but 
they were not irrational when merle. It is m:>netary policy that has chaBJed over 
the last few years, not the managerial capabilities of those farmers. ,:bey are 
probably better operators than they were five or 10 years ago, though their net 
worth may be a fraction of what it was then. 
Fiscal policy has been a wild card too. Who could have predicted $200 
billion annual deficits for the mid-1980s, coupled with monetary policies am 
global uncertainties that in combination have driven the dollar upward to 
unprecedented levels. This scenario has put tremendous presure on all I!merican 
exporters, agricultural and non-agricultural. It is truly anazing that our farm 
exports have held up so well umer the cirCllllStances. 
we have also herl terrific weather in m:>St of the world during the past 
couple of years. In a market characterized by inelastic supply am dernam 
curves, that can have a precipitous impact on price, am it has. The bears have 
carried the day in m:>St cammodity markets recently. 
Finally, we might lllllP the energy crisis of a deccrle ago am the nore 
recent global recession together as examples of constraints on the dernam side. 
Oil importers hcrl to choose, at the margin, between energy am food a few years 
ago am greater experrlitures for energy meant lower experrlitures for food. We 
felt the impact of that phenanenon, as did all other agricultural exporters. 
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Just as that crisis began to ease a bit cyclical am other ecoronic factors 
brought the world nearly to its knees in a recession of major proportions. Debt 
burdens skyrocketed in the lesser developed nations, am the entire world 
JOOnetary system was jeopardized. That too was devastating to American 
agriculture because the LDCs were our fastest 9rowing customers. 
After all this, is it any womer that U.S. farm incane began to fall! 
III. The Outlook 
Enough of the pasti let's turn now to the future am see if there are any 
bri9ht spots in this rather bleak picture. They are hard to discern in 1984, 
but I am cautiously optimistic about 1985 am beyorXl. 
The one imnediate shining li9ht is the 9lobal econanic recovery. There 
should no longer be any doubt about the strength of the U.S. recovery, though 
the media is unlikely ever to 9ive Reagananics credit for it! We have IOOre 
people working than ever before, am they have lOOney to spend. Consumer 
confidence is hi9h, am that will be reflected in the demand for all products, 
including food, in the caning IOOnths. The rest of the world trails in the 
recovery process, but 9rowth estimates for 1985 are optimistic al100st 
everyWere. Demand will certainly rise next year in IIOSt developed countries, 
am even the developing world is recovering except tIdlere the debt locrl is 
unbearable (primarily Latin America). 
Notwi thstaming that bit of 900d news, we will oot get much help on the 
exchange rate front. The dollar may slip a bit in the caning year, but not 
much. Interest rates may decline sanewhat too, but oot much. My judgment is 
that the probabilities for an increase in the value of the dollar and in short 
and long term interest rates are about as 9reat as the ~ilities for a 
decline. FUrthermore, I see little likelihood of a major movement in either 
before 1985. 
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Farm lard values may have bottaned out earlier this year, but I doubt it. 
I suspect we are in for a modest price decline this coming winter, hopefully our 
last deflationary gasp! Should that oot be the case, we are going to lose a lot 
of quality fanners over the next two or three years. Lenders just cannot 
tolerate much more deterioration in net worth statements. 
For producers, the short run outlook is at least mildly optimistic for 
products aimed primarily at the danestic market, which is recovering rapidly. 
OUtlook is bleakest for products which are heavily export dependent, since that 
segment of demand is still lagging. This situation should reverse itself in the 
longer run, but fanners must find ways to survive the short run before savoring 
the long run taste of export expansion! 
IV. Where Now 
Everyone in this roan has an interest in agricultural p:>licy. It is fran 
you that we must generate creative ideas for dealing with the financial 
challenges of American agriculture. The old p:>licy prescriptions are 
unreSlX'nsive and obsolete, merle irrelevant by the global nature of the market-
place in which u.S. farmers must canpete. Therefore, if we are to provide 
incane protection for our agricultural producers (a prop:>sition that will be 
fiercely debated in the future), we must find oo~trerlitional ways to do so. If 
we canoot develop economically sound p:>licies for rationalizing u.S. 
agriculture, rerlical solutions will inevitably cane to the fore. sane have 
surfaced alreaCiy, and we are likely to see a lot more by next year. 
What then should we do? 
First, "farm prograns· as we have known them need to be placed in their 
proper perspective. They are not, and will oot be, a panacea for our farm 
income woes. The days of $30 billion PIK progrcms are over. That kind of 
economic rescue effort is unlikely ever again to be mounted by any u.s. 
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administration, irrespective of political persuasion. '!here are just too many 
canpeting priorities for limited taxpayer dollars. In cKldition, the U.S. 
populace has clearly becane more conservative in recent years. OUr people are 
just not in the JOOOd to sperxi billions of dollars on farm subsidies, no matter 
how the progran is couched, arxi notwithstarxiiBJ the great affection they feel 
for farm people. Huge farm prograns are just not in the cards politically. 
But let us not despair. If there be answers to the annipresent "farm 
proble:n," we just might discover that they are located outside the "farm 
progran" sphere anyway. Governnent intrusion into agriculture obviously has not 
worked terribly weIll were it otherwise, we would not still be at the drawing 
boards after 50 years of fam legislation. On many occasions during the past 
half century, American agriculture would have been better off if goverrment ha:t 
s~ly stepped aside arxi pemitted our efficient farmers to do their thiBJ. 
Nevertheless, there are macroeconanic steps that can be taken by our 
governnent, the ~ct of which will be positive irxieed for agriculture. (AOO, 
as agricultural econanists, we should never ignore or minimize the importance of 
microeconanic steps that can be taken by producers the:nselves.) Let's start 
with what I would consider the top priority. Nothing would help American 
farmers more than a diligent, concerted, successful effort by Congress aOO the 
Administration to reduce dramatically our $200 billion federal deficit. DoiBJ 
so would have a bullish ~ct on U.S. financial markets, aOO would almost 
certainly bring interest rates down. Were the magnitme of federal borrowiBJ to 
recede, the Federal Reserve would also be more inclined to loosen monetary 
policy. Inflationary expectations would be reduced as our governnent began to 
get its fiscal house in order, arxi that would provide a higher canfort level to 
monetary policymakers. In other words, Paul Volcker and his colleagues at the 
Federal Reserve could relax a bit if they no longer ha:t to shoulder the entire 
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burden of inflation control. 
'!he fiscal aOO oonetary a:3justments just outlined would assuredly have an 
~ct on our exchange rate, where high real rates of interest have siphoned 
enonrous quantities of capital to the U.S. fran other countries. Once that 
siphon is reversed, the dollar will fall, perhaps appreciably. With the 
relative success we have had exporting agricultural products in the face of a 
strong dollar, we ought to be gangbusters if the dollar declines in a major way! 
I would then add tra:3e policy to this picture, emphasizing that it is 
imperative to have another rourrl of GATT negotiations soon with agriculture 
being one of the centerpieces. In the past, agriculture has ha:3 short shrift in 
GATT negotiations, due primarily to the resistance of the European Cannunity. 
Stating it less elegantly, we have simply been out-negotiated. It is time that 
we insist on improved rules for international tra:3e in agriculture by infonnil'¥J 
our trading partners that we will otherwise be much less magnanimous in future 
tra:3e disputes. we should be prepared to aggressively protect our own 
agricultural tra:3e interests on a case b¥ case basis if aOO when the GATT rules 
prOlle to be ineffective. we have operated with kid glOlles in this area for much 
too long. 
I subnit to you that if we, the United States, do our job right in fiscal, 
oonetary, aOO trade policy Oller the next few years, fann incanes will rise 
substantially. (We will have a healthier OIIerall econany too.) And I further 
sut:mit that what we do in fiscal, oonetary aOO tra:3e policy is infinitely oore 
important than anything we can or will do through tra:3itional "farm programs." 
The latter are still important, but I rate them as the fourth aOO least 
important of the legs on this policy stool. Most fann organizations 
tra:3itionally expeoo most of their lobbying efforts on fann prograns, aOO 
little in these other areas. '!hat has to change if they are to properly 
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represent their farm constituents. (The sane applies to governnent 
appointments, where agricultural organizations have generally paid little 
attention to positions outside the Department of Agriculture.) 
V. '!be Farm Policy Leg 
In basic fam policy our primary objective should be to avoid repeatiD;J 
past errors. That costs us nothiD;J, an:1 it could gain us a great deal. 
Foremost on our list should be the need to avoid export restraints. Governnent 
officials keep makiD;J carmitments in this area, but those carmitments do not 
always seem sincere. The benefit-cost ratio of agricultural export restrictions 
is negative, an:1 will remain so. As a consequence, we should decisively, an:1 
with finality, rE!lOO\7e them as a policy option. If we continue to be challeD;Jed 
geopolitically, as is probable, we should meet those challeD;Jes in another way 
an:1 with a strategy that has at least a chance to succeed! 
OUr principal export objective should be to increase market share. For 
that we should not apologize to anyone. On the contrary, we should be can:1id 
with our export canpetitors, telliD;J them that we are no 10n:Jer williD;J to 
accept a share of the world market that does not ~rly reflect the 
canpetitiveness of American agriculture. If we must use credit prograns, 10n:J 
term agreements or other market developnent efforts in order to achieve the 
market share that would be ours through free canpetition, then we should pursue 
those efforts. we ought to have even an export subsidy arrow in our quiver, 
though I hope it need not be used. 
we are superb Producersl we now need to becane canparably proficient as 
international marketers. 
we have 10n:J used loan levels as the basic safety net for our farmers. 
Unfortunately, doiD;J so stimulates irresistible political pressures to raise 
loan rates duriD;J difficult econc:mic times. That in turn jeopardizes our 
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international competitiveness, costing us export markets that we would otherwise 
daninate. We must learn to keep loan levels below global market prices and, if 
we need a safety net, prO\! ide it in other ways. 
Under our present system target prices are a more appropriate income 
protection device. But farmers feel squeamiSh about getting deficiency payment 
checks fran the Federal gO\!ernment. They would rather deliver their crops under 
a non-recourse loan program.. This reaction is understandable for no one likes 
to be palpably on the federal dole. But it is oot defensible fran a policy 
standpoint. If the American taxpayer is to foot the bill for agriculture's 
safety net, that bill ought to be visible. The taxpayer has a right to know 
what a farm program (or food stamps, social security or any other safety net, 
for that matter) truly costs. We who are ccmnitted to a strong, healthy 
agricul ture should be able to defend the level of target prices, or whatever 
alternative safety net we advocate. If we canoot do so, openly and with candor, 
we are not entitled to that incane protection. The burden of persuasion is on 
us. 
If the budget for traditional farm programs is destined to decline, as I 
believe it is, we must also search for ways to get more "bang for the buck" in 
our incane protection programs. Perhaps we should consider abandoning the use 
of support loans, target prices, or any other safety net mechanism for farms 
that are really not farms, i.e., for those people who earn their basic living 
off farms and for whan agricultural incane is only supplementary. Defining and 
delineating such a group would be difficult, of course. And, at the other end 
of the spectrun, perhaps we should also consider abandoning such programs for 
large scale operations where net incane is typically such that a safety net is 
unnecessary. Defining and delineating that group would obviously also be 
difficult. I am not advocating this course, but only suggesting that we must 
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scmehow use our farm program dollars more efficiently. with a severely 
constrained budget, as seems likely for the future, USDA will have to find ways 
to pinpoint its programs with greater precision. We have often used a shotgun 
approach to farm policy in the past, sanetimes effective but always inefficient. 
It would now seem imperative to find rifles, if we can, to do the assigned job 
at much less cost. 
The agricultural eoonanists in this audience today can probably do more to 
contribute to imaginative farm policy than anyone I know. And you certainly 
have a role to play in the important areas of fiscal, monetary and trade policy. 
I hope you will provide ample input between now and next spring, for 1985 may be 
one of the most critical policymaking years in the history of U.s. agriculture. 
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